We have successfully mitigated the incident, and the affected service is now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored and the service is performing as expected.

### Summary On March 6, 2026, between 02:19 UTC and 04:00 UTC, Bitbucket Cloud experienced an incident impacting the web app, API, CLI, and Pipelines operations. This was caused by the Bitbucket application hitting a regional provisioning API rate limit with our hosting provider, preventing application workers from handling website traffic. The incident was detected within 1 minute by automated monitoring and mitigated by scaling systems down and then back up to full capacity which put Atlassian systems into a known good state. ### **IMPACT** The incident resulted in a Bitbucket Cloud services being unavailable for 1 hour and 6 minutes on March 6, 2026 between 02:19 UTC and 03:25 UTC, followed by degraded website performance until 04:00 UTC. During this time, customers were unable to access Bitbucket services including the web app, Git operations \(clone, push, pull over HTTPS and SSH\), API, and running builds in Pipelines. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The issue stemmed from a change to an internal deployment system that increased use of a platform credential service, hitting a quota with our hosting provider. This blocked Bitbucket services from deploying additional capacity because new application nodes request the credential service on startup and were rate limited. This caused degradation of Bitbucket experiences and more failed requests to Bitbucket Cloud’s website and public APIs. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** The incident response team manually scaled down Bitbucket services, then gradually scaled them back up while closely monitoring our quota. We simultaneously engaged with our hosting provider to temporarily increasing this limit to unblock bringing more Bitbucket service capacity online. We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, Bitbucket services lacked necessary boundaries to be resilient to upstream platform system changes. To help minimise the impact of breaking changes to our environments, we will implement additional preventative measures such as: * Improve monitoring of shared Atlassian platform resources. * Update Bitbucket application bootstrapping to prevent new capacity from failing during resource contention of shared platform services. * Reduce Bitbucket’s dependency on shared hosting provider services. * Deploy Bitbucket services across multiple regions to reduce single-region failure risk. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

On January 28, 2026, affected Bitbucket Cloud users in eu-west-1 may have experienced some service disruption. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

### Summary On Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, Atlassian customers using Bitbucket Cloud could not load the dashboard landing page. Users also faced degraded performance and intermittent failures navigating other parts of the application or using public REST APIs. The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API, causing long-running queries on a database which resulted in failed web and api requests. The incident was detected within three minutes by automated monitoring systems and mitigated by introducing stricter limits on the API for certain traffic, while taking manual actions on the impacted database, restoring Bitbucket to a healthy state. ### **IMPACT** Occurring on Bitbucket Cloud on Jan 7, 2026, between 15:28 UTC and 17:04 UTC, the incident caused degraded performance and intermittent failures to a subset of customers interacting with the Bitbucket web application and public APIs. Git operations over SSH and HTTPS were not impacted. ### **ROOT CAUSE** The event was caused by an unexpected load on a public API. The request volume during this period resulted in high resource utilization our central database’s read replicas, impacting website and our API performance and reliability. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know outages reduce your productivity. Although we have several testing and prevention processes, this issue went undetected because a specific request pattern on a public API was not tested against the traffic volume seen during the incident. We prioritized the following actions to prevent repeating this type of incident: * Improve rate limiting and caching capabilities at multiple points in our networking and application layers. * Apply stricter rate limits for specific public APIs to protect infrastructure health and shared application resources. * Optimize performance of specific queries and codepaths on these APIs to handle high request loads. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

We have successfully mitigated the incident and the affected service is now fully operational. Our teams have verified that normal functionality has been restored. Thank you for your patience and understanding while we worked to resolve this issue.